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BOOK REVIEW
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, VOLUME II, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801-1815. GEORGE L. HASKINS AND HERBERT A.
JOHNSON. New York: Macmillan, 1981. Pp. 687, Tables and Index.
$35.
WILLIAM

F.

SWINDLER*

Ten years after the publication of the first volume of this exhaustive history of the Supreme Court,1 the second of a projected
eleven volumes has been published. Volume II is the fourth of the
series to be released: Volumes I and VI appeared in 1971, the former covering the opening decade of the Court, and the latter covering the record of the Court and the Constitution in the post-Civil
War period; 2 Volume V, published m 1974, chronicles the Taney
Chief Justiceship.s The total project, funded by the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise of the Library of Congress, began more than a
quarter of a century ago.4
* John Marshall Professor of Law Emeritus, College of William and Mary.

1. J. GoEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME I,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971). This pioneer volume placed the little-known
opening decade of the Court into the context of the whole eighteenth century and confirmed
the existence of a vast amount of previously unused documentary material in the Federal
Records Centers of the National Archives. A major editorial project subsequently was undertaken by the Supreme Court Historical Society, under the editorship of Maeva Marcus,
to collect this and other primary source material supplemental to the Holmes Devise His-

tory. The first of a multivolume series entitled
COURT,

2. C.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME

1789-1801, will be published by Columbia University Press early in 1983.
FAiRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME

VI,

RE-

CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, PART ONE (1971).
3. C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME V, THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-1864 (1974).

4. The Devise is administered by a permanent committee of which the Librarian of Con-

gress is an ex officio member. See G.

HASKINS and H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME H1, THE FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL,

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:329

Three volumes will be devoted to the history of the Court under
Chief Justice Marshall, confirming the fundamental importance of
the thirty-five years during which the Marshall Court laid the
foundation of American federalism. Each of the volumes represents
one of the three main periods generally recognized as comprising
the history of the Marshall Court: the Foundations of Power, an
aptly chosen title for the present volume, covers the years 18011815; The Struggle for Nationalism covers the years 1815-1825;
and The Challenge of JacksonianDemocracy covers from 1825 to
Marshall's death.5 The present work, Volume II, is the joint product of Professor Haskins of the University of Pennsylvania' and
Professor Johnson of the University of South Carolina. Professor
Johnson also was the first editor of the project on the Papers of
John Marshall, sponsored by the College of William and Mary and
its Institute of Early American History and Culture.7 The two following volumes will be produced by Professor Gerald Gunther of
Stanford University."
The authors of Volume II divide the period 1801-1815 topically
rather than chronologically. Haskins, the original appointee for the
volume, traces the evolving constitutional definition of the Court
from the renowned case of Marbury v. Madison9 to the settlement,
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,10 of the great dispute over state's
rights which brought Marshall and Joseph Story into confrontation
with Spencer Roane and the massed Jeffersonians. Johnson, in his
part of the volume, addresses developments less glamorous than
this titanic constitutional struggle, but equally important to the
foundations of American federal law-maritime" and international
1801-1815, at xi (1981) [hereinafter cited as HASKINS & JOHNSON].
5. This division of the history of the Marshall period has long been recognized. See L.
BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW, Book Four (1974); W. SWINDLER, THE CONSTITION
AND CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL, chs. 1-5 (1978); C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY, VOLUME I passim (1922).

6. Professor Haskins is the author of a definitive study of colonial law, G. HASKINS, LAW
AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960).
7. See H. JOHNSON, JOHN JAY, COLONIAL LAWYER (1966) (microfilm); H. JOHNSON, THE
LAW MERCHANT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1963).
8. For Gunther's previous work on the subject, see G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (1969).

9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

10. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 459-92 (ch. 3).
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law,12 public land policy,13 and the federal common law of crimes. 14
The fifteen years covered by this volume unquestionably are the
most critical in all of American judicial history. As Professor Paul
Freund of Harvard, general editor of the Holmes Devise project,
writes in the opening foreword: "The Court [during this period]
might languish in benign obscurity or it might go down under the
lash of active contempt. 1 5 Haskins, in his own preface, adds: "A
relatively feeble institution" at the time of Marshall's appointment, the Court "nevertheless acquired in only a few years' time,
and largely under the guiding hand of John Marshall, more power
than even the framers of the Constitution may have anticipated."' 6
Marshall's contribution made the Court an instrument of statecraft, "a bulwark of an identifiable rule of law as distinct from the
7
accommodations of politics.'
This characterization of Marshall's contribution to the Court is a
restatement of an already frequently stated historical verdict.18
Haskins, however, has confirmed this verdict with fresh documentation illuminated in a significantly new perspective. The first four
of Haskins' ten chapters are devoted to the political background of
Thomas Jefferson's fateful attack on the Federalist judiciary,
which prepared the way for Marbury in 1803 and the treason trial
of Aaron Burr in 1807, landmarks that established, respectively,
the reviewability of acts of Congress and of the Executive.1 The
reviewability of state acts under the "supreme law of the land"
provision inexorably followed in Fletcher v. Peck2" and the
Fairfax lands case.2 2
The Burr treason trial was a criminal proceeding in which Chief

12. Id. at 526-58 (ch. 5).
13. Id. at 588-611 (ch. 7).
14. Id. at 612-46 (ch. 8).
15. Id. at xiii.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 7.
19. See W. SwINDLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND CHIF JUSTICE MARSHALL, ch. 2 (The Supreme Court and Congress) and ch. 3 (The Supreme Court and the President) (1978).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
22. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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Justice Marshall sat as a circuit judge.23 This trial presented issues
of executive answerability that did not become ruling constitutional law until the Watergate litigation in 1974.24 Burr's trial offers a unique view of Marshall handling a case at the trial level,
because the trial's sensationalism insured the preservation of a
25
more complete record than most lower court cases of the time.
Haskins concludes that the record demonstrates "the care and meticulousness of [Marshall's] scholarship and . . . his ability to
reach out and formulate - on the basis of existing doctrine and
accepted substantive and procedural rules - new and revised concepts in American law."26
Any history of the Supreme Court, and particularly of the Marshall era, inevitably tends to become a history of the Constitution
as well. The study of the institutional development of the Court
itself, which presumably is the primary focus of the Holmes Devise
History, continues in Johnson's part of this volume. In his opening
chapter entitled "Introduction: The Business of the Court," Johnson observes that, despite the spectacular nature of the great constitutional cases, there was "a shift in the nature of cases heard,"
accompanied by a shift in "the procedural mode by which those
matters were presented. 2 7 Despite the explosiveness of states'
rights issues as exemplified by Fletcher v. Peck,28 the majority of
cases reviewed were federal cases; thus, the Court began to settle
into its primary role of "policing the federal system."2 9
In this area of judicial business, as much as in the constitutional
area, the Chief Justice was the dominant figure. Johnson points

23. The case was tried in Richmond before Marshall as Circuit Judge and Cyrus Griffin as
District Judge. The circuit court had jurisdiction over Virginia and the "western waters" of
the Ohio where the indictable acts allegedly took place. See Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, §
4, 2 Stat. 156-57. The history of the Fourth Circuit, to which Virginia belonged both before
and after the 1802 statute, is being prepared as part of the circuit history projects of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.
24. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
25. The Burr trial has been exhaustively studied. Among the more important recent
studies are: T. ABERNATHY, THE BURR CONSPIRACY (1954); L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL
LmERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963); W. McCALEB, A NEW LIGHT ON AARON BuRR (1963).
26. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 246.
27. Id. at 378.
28. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
29. For a discussion of the "policing" role of the Court, see W. SWINDLER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, ch. 3, § 11 (to be published in 1983).
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out that "[fjrom 1801 through 1815, [Marshall] delivered 209, or
fifty-five percent, of the opinions of the Court."' Marshall's prolific opinion writing demonstrated his energetic approach to his
own responsibilities and also tended to replace the seriatim opinion with the institutional opinion, giving added weight to the controlling force of the precedents - a condition which in any age
makes the bar of the Court more comfortable.3 1 Although "a limited trend toward the 'opinion of the Court"' developed under
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth'3 2 Marshall, in both constitutional
and nonconstitutional cases, used per curiam opinions rather than
definitive disquisitions to shape the law and the function of the
judicial branch.
Johnson concludes chapter one with a summation: "In beating a
strategic retreat before the armies of Jeffersonian legislators, the
judges arrived at a delineation of judicial power such that even
their detractors were forced to concede the validity of their pretensions, and Republican judges found incumbent Federalist judges to
be of one mind with them. Upon this consensus was built the foundations of the Supreme Court of the United States as we know it
s
today.' 33
An important area of federal law - public if not strictly constitutional - is discussed in the fourth chapter of this part of the
volume, under the heading "The Articulation of American Nationality." As an aid to diplomacy, this jurisprudential area augmented
the commercial law principles enunciated in the admiralty cases
discussed in chapter three; but this area also committed the Court
to the consistent notice of "the rules concerning citizenship in the
United States and the various States of the federal Union." Rejection of "the British doctrine of perpetual allegiance" completed
the sovereign act of independence begun in 1776, a process which
Jay's Treaty had attempted with indifferent results 5 and which

30. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 358.
31. See, e.g., address by Judge Edward D. Re entitled "Stare Decisis," reprinted in 79
F.R.D. 509, 512 (1978).
32. HAsKiNs & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 383.

33. Id. at 406.
34. Id. at 493.
35. For a discussion of Jay's Treaty and its effect on the work of the Court, see J. GOEBEL,
supra note 1, at 749-52.
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the War of 1812 only exacerbated. The often overlooked side effect
of the Fairfax litigation, which came to a climax in the immediate
postwar years, was a judicial resolution of the citizenship question
as significant as the judicial review principle established in Marbury. As in Marbury, Marshall turned the Jeffersonian argument
against itself, and in a series of cases between 1809 and 1815, the
Court shifted the effect of the "perpetual allegiance" doctrine.36
The discussion of the cases involving the development of American nationality leads to chapter five and coverage of international
law, a subject already masterfully treated3 7 but now addressed in
the complete historical context of the Court. Although Johnson
contends that the area of private international law, alternatively
referred to in American jurisprudence as conflicts of law, was developed inadequately, 8 one might speculate that Justice Joseph
Story's experience with the frustrations of the Court in this area
prompted his definitive statement of conflicts doctrine a generation later.3 9 In any event, the cases on foreign governmental and
commercial relations served to broaden the Court's own definition
of the commerce clause4" and planted seeds that would bear fruit a
decade later.41
On balance, the authors conclude, the fifteen years that opened
the Marshall Court established the judiciary as an impartial arbiter of issues that would affect the nation's development and maturity through most of the nineteenth century. For the further history of the Court's functioning during this period, scholars must
await anxiously the remaining volumes in the too-long-delayed
Holmes Devise Series.

36. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 524-25.
37. See B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL (1939).
38. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 558.
39. See G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME
(1970); J. STORY, COMMENTAIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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